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I
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    t is not widely known that the largest, longest-running military action of 
the American Revolutionary War was a siege that did not take place in the 
territory of the future United States.1 It did not take place in the Western 
Hemisphere, it was not led by an American general, and it did not involve 
forces of the American Continental Army.2 The distinction belongs to the 
1779 siege of Gibraltar at the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.3 
Eager to avenge and reverse losses of colonial territory, France and Spain 
recognized American independence and entered the war with Great Britain 
in 1778 and 1779, respectively.4 Both continental powers provided signifi-
cant arms and financial support to the Americans throughout the conflict. 
Both also engaged in pitched battles with the British, none as storied as the 
epic 1,323-day siege of the British Gibraltar garrison.5 
The siege began in September of 1779 when Spain launched a naval 
blockade against the British-held outpost. Although he fielded considerable 
troops and artillery, the Spanish commander resolved to starve rather than 
to assault the formidable British garrison.6 Through October, the Spanish 
force effectively prevented any major resupply by land or sea.7 By the winter 
of 1779, the garrison’s food and cooking fuels ran short.8 Scurvy set in 
                                                                                                                      
1. ROY ADKINS & LESLIE ADKINS, GIBRALTAR: THE GREATEST SIEGE IN BRITISH 
HISTORY 335–38 (2017). 
2. During the American Revolutionary War, John Jay, in his capacity as Minister 
Plenipotentiary to the Court of Spain, sent the Virginian, Louis Littlepage to Spain, 
who reportedly observed a portion of the siege of Gibraltar from a Spanish gunboat. 
See Virginia Johnson, General Lewis Littlepage: Soldier, Spy, and King’s Confidant, 1762–1802, 
LIBRARY POINT (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.librarypoint.org/blogs/post/lewis-littlepage/ 
(citing CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS, THE KING’S CHEVALIER: A BIOGRAPHY OF LEWIS 
LITTLEPAGE (1961)). Although Littlepage later became a general, he did not attend the 
Gibraltar siege in that capacity or command American military forces there. Id. 
3. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 10. 
4. Whether the war between Spain and France on one hand and the British on the other 
is best characterized as a feature of the American Revolution or a separate armed conflict is 
a matter of perspective. Hostilities between these European belligerents, of course, preceded 
the American conflict, most immediately in the Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763. 
5. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 4. 
6. SAMUEL ANCELL, A CIRCUMSTANTIAL JOURNAL OF THE LONG AND TEDIOUS 
BLOCKADE AND SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR FROM THE 12TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1779 TO THE 23RD 
DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1782, at 9 (Liverpool, Charles Wosencroft 1784). 
7. Id. at 13. 
8. Id. at 20. 
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among the besieged British soldiers and food rationing extended to civilians, 
including spouses and children trapped with the garrison.9 
On January 17, 1780, the tide of the siege briefly turned when a relief 
fleet dispatched from England ran the Spanish blockade.10 Warships and 
supply boats poured soldiers and provisions into the garrison through early 
February 1780.11 The convoy saved the garrison from near-certain surren-
der.12 On the relief fleet’s departure, however, the siege resumed and ex-
tended into summer. Within weeks, physical isolation reduced the garrison 
to subsistence on salted meat and exorbitantly priced supplies smuggled 
through the blockade by North African, Portuguese, and even Spanish mer-
chants.13 By autumn, the defenders mounted civilian evacuations on perilous 
runs through the blockade to reduce demand on dwindling supplies.14 When 
the besiegers intercepted these efforts, they forced those captured to return 
to Gibraltar.15 By the second winter of the siege, deprivation and disease 
again tormented the defenders and remaining civilians. Desertions mounted 
among the British force as provisions dwindled and hopelessness set in.16 By 
April 1781 Spanish advances finally brought the British garrison into effec-
tive artillery range, and the succeeding bombardment inflicted horrendous 
casualties and damage.17 
 In response, London dispatched a second relief fleet.18 Twenty-nine 
ships of the line escorted one hundred supply transports into Gibraltar’s 
port, again saving the garrison.19 The relief fleet withdrew with the majority 
of Gibraltar’s one thousand civilians aboard, greatly extending the remaining 
defenders’ capability to resist starvation. By late 1781 and early 1782, the 
British depended on Portuguese merchant ships regularly running the Span-
ish blockade to provide food, as well as intelligence on the surrounding 
force.20 In conjunction with British raiding sorties against the Spanish siege 
                                                                                                                      
9. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 155–61. 
10. ANCELL supra note 6, at 29–30; ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 108–13. 
11. ANCELL supra note 6, at 36. 
12. F. J. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF GIBRALTAR AND ITS SIEGES 257 (London, 
Provost 1870). 
13. ANCELL supra note 6, at 38–50; STEPHENS, supra note 12, at 259. 
14. ANCELL supra note 6, at 66, 68–69. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 93, 96, 97, 99, 104, 125, 161. 
17. Id. at 124. 
18. ADKINS & ADKINS, supra note 1, at 185–88. 
19. Id.; STEPHENS, supra note 12, at 261. 
20. ANCELL supra note 6, at 163, 192, 195–96, 199. 
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works, their support extended the siege significantly.21 Still, a passage from 
the letters of a British officer captures the intensity of the besieged popula-
tion’s suffering: 
 
[Y]ou find Death busy—the lamp of life faintly burns—your friends are 
absent—the foe shews no tenderness—you sigh, weep, groan, pray, beg, 
intreat, and in the bitter agonies implore Almighty god to be merciful to a 
poor sinner—life hangs on a hair—the cordage of your heart cracks, and 
you drop into an unknown world where the secrets of all hearts are dis-
closed.22 
 
Through the history of warfare, human suffering has seldom been more 
dire than during sieges. Although bombings, envelopments, and other forms 
of maneuver often deprive civilian populations of life-sustaining support, no 
military operation does so as drastically, as deliberately, or as systematically 
as siege. Sieges attempt to achieve through sequestration and deprivation 
what might otherwise require enormously costly assaults or bombardments. 
By their very nature, sieges involve a stark, deliberate, and sustained conflict 
between the interests of humanity and military necessity. The military imper-
ative of effecting and maintaining complete physical, psychological, and, in 
modern operations, electronic isolation clashes directly with the basic hu-
manitarian needs of civilian populations trapped with besieged forces. It is 
unsurprising that sieges have produced some of war’s harshest and most 
tragic tales of human suffering. 
A comparably harsh legal regime has accompanied siege. Formerly, 
sieges licensed merciless looting and killing of defeated military forces and 
civilian populations alike.23 While the practice of pillage is no longer lawful, 
modern siege law still tolerates deliberate infliction of extreme deprivation. 
Besieging forces have also been free to reject passages of humanitarian relief 
without explanation. States have consented to restraints on their prerogative 
to deny offers of relief under only the narrowest conditions.24 While all law 
of war rules and principles reflect a balance between humanity and military 
                                                                                                                      
21. Id. at 172–79. 
22. Id. at 101. 
23. JOSH LEVITHAN, ROMAN SIEGE WARFARE 205 (2013) (describing “thorough 
plunder” as the primary activity of the post-siege setting in Roman war); Geoffrey Parker, 
Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN 
WORLD 48 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994); 
MAURICE KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 120–22 (1965). 
24. See infra text accompanying note 135. 
 
 
 
Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege Vol. 95 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
necessity, few skew so drastically to the former as the law of siege. At a time 
when legal vindication of humanitarian interests during war is ascendant, the 
conventional law of siege may seem an outlier full of glaring gaps in logic. 
Since 2013, organs of the United Nations (UN) have consistently de-
plored conditions endured by civilians trapped by armed conflicts, especially 
by siege operations in Syria.25 The UN Security Council has specifically con-
demned the belligerent parties’ unwillingness to permit or facilitate delivery 
of humanitarian aid to besieged populations.26 Moved by rampant human 
suffering among encircled and isolated civilians, the UN commissioned ex-
perts to report on legal issues associated with humanitarian relief operations. 
Two Oxford University professors and a consulting group of legal experts 
studied and analyzed belligerent parties’ obligations toward relief actions un-
der international law. Their report combines incontrovertible descriptive 
truths of human suffering with clever legal interpretations and laudable hu-
manitarian aspirations. Where conventional accounts of the law of siege have 
portrayed a consent-based system in which belligerents may, for the most 
part, freely agree to or reject offers of relief,27 the Oxford Guidance depicts a 
regime wherein States may not arbitrarily reject relief actions and must offer 
reasoned justifications for turning away offers of humanitarian assistance to 
besieged populations.28 
                                                                                                                      
25. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2401 (Feb. 24, 2018); S.C. Res. 2328 (Dec. 19, 2016); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 
2139 (2014), ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/2014/208 (Mar. 24, 2014). 
26. S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013); S.C. Res. 2043 (Apr. 
21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2042 (Apr. 14, 2012). 
27. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶ 9.12.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK LOAC MANUAL] (emphasizing that relief to 
besieged areas is contingent on belligerent consent); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 44a (1956) [hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE] (“The commander of the investing force has the right to forbid all communi-
cations and access between the besieged place and the outside.”). But see OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.20.1 
(rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] ( “States . . . should not arbi-
trarily withhold consent.”) (emphasis added); Cedric Ryngaert, Humanitarian Assistance and 
the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective, 5 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 4, 5 (Spring 2013) 
(observing ab initio “without consent, humanitarian actors cannot provide relief” and “a 
combination of . . . different legal principles may yield the rule that states may indeed refuse 
consent, but not for arbitrary or capricious reasons.”) (first emphasis added). 
28. DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHARA GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE 
LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CON-
FLICT (2016) [hereinafter OXFORD GUIDANCE]. 
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The Oxford Guidance surely illustrates the potential for law and lawyers to 
alleviate human suffering. It addresses persistent logical shortcomings of the 
law and presents a compelling example of how humanitarian logic—rea-
soned resolutions of legal interpretive dilemmas undertaken to vindicate hu-
man welfare—can inform, and perhaps improve, treaty interpretation and 
the balance between humanity and military necessity. 
But is law of war interpretation simply a matter of applying humanitarian 
logic? The law of war attends carefully to humanity, including rules applica-
ble to relief operations. These rules, when observed, humanize armed con-
flict and reduce unnecessary suffering in war. Yet careful law of war study 
reveals that no rule is maximally protective—none extends to the full logical 
limits of human welfare. Each rule concedes, as it must, to concerns of sov-
ereignty, practicality, and military necessity. As the conventional account 
maintains, nearly every law of war duty with respect to humanitarian relief is 
conditioned on the consent of belligerents. Accounts of law of war doctrine 
require meticulous attention to the conditions and requirements of combat 
operations. Careful and deliberate consideration of military necessity—the 
operational imperatives for effective and successful prosecution of war—
have proved an essential component of law of war formation and, therefore, 
of its interpretation and implementation. 
Considering its compelling subject, the source of its mandate, and the 
stature of the institution that produced it, a careful examination of the Oxford 
Guidance from both doctrinal and operational perspectives is essential. Many 
will find its interpretive attention to results that relieve human suffering a 
commendable example of progressive, purposive analysis. Yet closer exami-
nation reveals an interpretation that inexorably prioritizes humanitarian pur-
poses over plain reading and State intent to support logically appealing, 
though doctrinally, historically, and operationally troubling conclusions. 
Experience with siege operations suggests the Oxford Guidance underval-
ues the role that the military imperative of isolating besieged forces played 
in the formation of the law. Siege operations past and present—perhaps the 
epitome of conflict between humanitarian need and military necessity—
merit thorough consideration in any account of the law of relief actions. 
While perhaps out of synch with modern sensibilities toward human suffer-
ing, the conventional law of siege may be justified in light of military experi-
ence with siege. In its results and methods, the Oxford Guidance underappre-
ciates how these experiences informed the balance between humanity and 
military necessity struck by the States that codified the law of war applicable 
to relief actions. While the humanitarian logic and regulatory aspirations of 
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the Oxford Guidance are admirable, military logic and military imperatives re-
quire equally deliberate attention in formulating the international law regu-
lating the critical matter of humanitarian relief during armed conflict. It is a 
worthy example of humanitarian logic, but the Oxford Guidance effects revi-
sions and legal evolutions better left to formal international law processes 
that involve States directly. 
 
II. ISOLATION: THE MILITARY IMPERATIVE OF SIEGE 
 
Modern military doctrine increasingly avoids the term siege in favor of the 
broader notion of encirclement.29 Yet this adjustment to military semantics 
should not be understood to imply obsolescence. A survey of modern armed 
conflict reveals sieges to be essential, if operationally undesirable, military 
actions.30 The demographics of urbanization and the evolution of warfare 
from contests over territory to contests for control of populations and hu-
man capital suggest continued, or even increased, resort to sieges and other 
operations that entrap or isolate civilian populations. During the last three 
decades, highly organized, well-equipped, and capable armed forces have 
been drawn into or resorted to siege operations in several armed conflicts 
including Lebanon,31 Chechnya,32 Bosnia,33 Iraq,34 and Syria,35 while siege-
like conditions quickly developed in Yemen.36 More than mere contests of 
                                                                                                                      
29. Lionel M. Beehner, Benedetta Berti & Michael T. Jackson, The Strategic Logic of Sieges 
in Counterinsurgencies, 47 PARAMETERS 77, 77 (Summer 2017). 
30. See, e.g., HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-06, URBAN OP-
ERATIONS ¶ 6-31 (2006) [hereinafter URBAN OPERATIONS] (cautioning military leaders to 
avoid attrition tactics during urban operations). 
31. See id. appendix A (providing military doctrinal analysis of the Israeli siege of West 
Beirut); see also George W. Gawrych, The Siege of Beirut, in BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE CHAL-
LENGES OF URBAN OPERATIONS 205 (William G. Robertson ed., 2003) [hereinafter BLOCK 
BY BLOCK]; RASHID KHALIDI, UNDER SIEGE: P.L.O. DECISIONMAKING DURING THE 1982 
WAR 43–66 (1986) (describing the military situation giving rise to the 1982 siege of West 
Beirut); David Koff, Chronology of the War in Lebanon, September–November, 1983, 13 JOURNAL 
OF PALESTINE STUDIES 127 (1984) (compiling and chronicling events during the late stages 
of the Israeli siege of West Beirut). 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 50–54. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 55–90. 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98. 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 102–04. 
36. See, e.g., Key Facts about the War in Yemen, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 25, 2018), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462. 
html. Rebel Houthi forces have placed portions of the city of Taiz under siege, preventing 
delivery of medical supplies and food to an entrapped civilian population. Id. See also Nasser 
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willpower, sieges have proved keen tests of applied military doctrine, leader-
ship, and combat effectiveness. 
Military tacticians and strategists insist that sealing off encircled forces 
from lines of operation, communication, and logistical support are su-
premely important during siege.37 Indeed, control of access to a besieged area 
is the sine qua non of siege.38 A U.S. Army field manual identifies physical, 
psychological, and electronic facets to isolation.39 Each is essential to success 
in modern siege operations. Physical isolation is easily understood and the 
most widely practiced form of isolation during sieges. It is the key to material 
attrition efforts, denying both logistical resupply and reinforcement to the 
besieged force.40 Physical isolation also diverts the efforts of the besieged 
force from defending against assault to countering the effects of deprivation 
imposed by isolation.41 Psychological isolation describes separation of the 
besieged force from outside political and moral support to reduce the will to 
resist.42 Information and deception operations are important aspects of psy-
chological isolation to impose a sense of hopelessness on the besieged 
force.43 Finally, electronic isolation has emerged as a critical aspect of mod-
ern siege operations.44 Network and electronic attacks reduce the besieged 
force’s capacity to plan and coordinate its defense. Electronic isolation also 
deprives the besieged force of critical outside intelligence sources. In com-
bination, these three facets of isolation have proved decisive during siege 
operations.45 
                                                                                                                      
Al-Sakkaf, Yemen’s Displaced in Dire Need of Food, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/yemen-displaced-dire-food-16021 
5115827332.html. 
37. 2 HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-90-2, RECON-
NAISSANCE, SECURITY, AND TACTICAL ENABLING TASKS 6-1–6-3 (2013) (instructing 
forces to isolate enemy forces during encirclement operations); URBAN OPERATIONS, 
supra note 30, ¶¶ 6–11, 7–54 (observing “Isolation is essential.”). 
38. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 78. The authors define siege as “any 
attempt by an adversary to control access into and out of a town, neighborhood, or other 
terrain of strategic significance to achieve a military or political objective.” Id. This definition 
omits the element of an entrapped enemy force. 
39. URBAN OPERATIONS, supra note 30, ¶¶ 6-11–14. 
40. Id. ¶ 6-12. 
41. Id. ¶ 7-56. 
42. Id. ¶ 6-14. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. ¶ 6-13. 
45. Id. ¶ 7-54 (“One key to success in the history of urban operations has been the 
effective isolation of the threat force.”). 
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History repeatedly confirms the imperative of absolute isolation to suc-
cessful sieges. In the Second World War, German forces rapidly enveloped 
the Soviet city of Leningrad in September 1941.46 When a determined de-
fense repulsed a final large-scale assault on the city, the Germans reverted to 
attrition tactics to bring the besieged Russians to submission. Mass starvation 
resulted. Within a matter of months, thousands of civilians died daily.47 Yet 
heroic determination—as well as dwindling German forces diverted to sup-
port offensive operations in southern and central Russia—permitted the 
Russians to keep narrow lines of resupply open. The siege lasted nearly three-
and-a-half years, until it was broken in January 1944.48 Ultimately, the Ger-
mans’ failure to fully isolate Leningrad from outside support, especially via a 
lake frozen in winter months, is credited with both prolonging the siege and 
saving the city’s inhabitants from total starvation (although as many as a mil-
lion civilians may have died).49 
Five decades later, Russian experience, this time as a besieging rather 
than a besieged force, confirmed the lesson of Leningrad. The Second Che-
chen War from 1999 to 2000 included a five-month siege of the city of 
Grozny.50 The Russians were determined to avenge a defeat in the 1994–95 
First Chechen War, during which poorly led and poorly organized Russian 
forces never fully isolated Chechen forces defending Grozny and ultimately 
were repulsed.51 A Russian after-action review of the first effort cited the 
inability to seal borders as a contributing factor to failure.52 Likewise, a Rus-
sian military journal advised that in future operations built up areas must be 
“unexpectedly, quickly, and completely” sealed off.”53 
                                                                                                                      
46. PAUL K. DAVIS, BESIEGED: 100 GREAT SIEGES FROM JERICHO TO SARAJEVO 
314 (2003). See also HARRISON SALISBURY, THE 900 DAYS (1969). 
47. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 314. 
48. Id. at 311, 315. 
49. Id. at 315. 
50. Timothy L. Thomas, The 31 December 1994–8 February 1995 Battle for Grozny, in 
BLOCK BY BLOCK, supra note 31, at 161. Incidentally, Grozny translates as “terrible” or 
“formidable.” Id. 
51. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 360–63; Thomas, supra note 50, at 161 (chronicling Russian 
urban combat operations); Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for 
Urban Combat, 29 PARAMETERS 87 (Summer 1999); Raymond C. Finch III, Why the 
Russian Military Failed in Chechnya 7, 12 (Foreign Military Studies Office, Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, Paper No. 98-16, 1998). 
52. Thomas, supra note 50, at 173 (indicating the Russian force did not seal the town 
until January 15, 1995, nearly a month -and-a half into the siege). 
53. Id. (citing Oleg Namsarayev, Sweeping Built Up Areas, ARMEYSKIY SBORNIK (Apr. 
1995)). 
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In their second attempt, as with their first, Russian forces resorted to 
extensive and indiscriminate bombardment, reducing the city almost entirely 
to rubble. Indeed, the Grozny campaigns are nearly synonymous with urban 
tactics of devastation. However, an important and overlooked facet of the 
1999 victory was the Russian commander’s complete blockade of the city 
from outside support, including humanitarian aid.54 Isolation, as much as 
willingness to resort to overwhelming (and almost certainly unlawful) force, 
cured the failures of the Russians’ previous effort to take Grozny by siege. 
Contemporaneously with the Chechen wars, the lesson of maintaining 
isolation during siege was made acutely clear in the Balkans. In April 1992, 
ethnic Serb forces of Bosnian nationality, supported by Serbia, laid siege to 
the Bosnia-Herzegovinian (Bosnian) city of Sarajevo.55 The Serbs’ objective 
was to bisect the city and to force capitulation of the Bosnian government 
in order to form a breakaway Serb state.56 
The Serbs enjoyed overwhelmingly superior military forces and tactical 
positions.57 A UN arms embargo on both belligerent parties practically sealed 
this advantage.58 Initial estimates predicted a quick victory for the Serbs.59 
Yet the siege dragged on for over three years, resulting in one of the longest 
sieges in modern warfare.60 Among many reasons for the siege’s duration 
was the Serbs’ inability to isolate the city physically and psychologically. Alt-
                                                                                                                      
54. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 84. 
55. OFFICE OF RUSSIAN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ANALYSIS, CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE YUGO-
SLAV CONFLICT, 1990–1995, at 152–53 (2002) [hereinafter BALKAN BATTLE-
GROUNDS]. 
56. PETER ANDREAS, BLUE HELMETS AND BLACK MARKETS: THE BUSINESS OF 
SURVIVAL IN THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO 26–27 (2008). 
57. See Curtis King, The Siege of Sarajevo, 1992–1995, in BLOCK BY BLOCK, supra note 
31, at 235, 246 (describing Serb control of high ground surrounding Sarajevo); see also 
BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 154, 308. 
58. S.C. Res. 757, ¶¶ 4–5 (May 27, 1992); S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 6 (Sept. 25, 1991); King, 
supra note 57, at 254 (noting the Bosnians initially lacked an external weapons benefactor 
such as Serbia was for the Bosnian Serbs). 
59. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 25; TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH, AND 
THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 194 (2000); JOHN FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, 
THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF USAIDS 
OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1991–
1996) 15 (2000). 
60. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 307. 
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hough Serbian armed forces encircled the city quickly, their lines proved po-
rous, permitting frequent resupplies of the besieged Bosnian forces and the 
civilian population trapped with them. 
The Serbs failed not only to seal Sarajevo from belligerent Bosnian sup-
port; they also failed to seal the city from international actors. The siege pro-
voked, and the Serbs ultimately consented to, enormous international and 
UN aid efforts, including a costly airlift.61 By 1995, a UN force of five thou-
sand persons worked from Sarajevo to protect and deliver humanitarian 
aid.62 One estimate indicates that as many as two hundred non-governmental 
organizations also provided humanitarian relief to Sarajevo.63 
Further, one scholar concluded that international involvement perpetu-
ated, rather than terminated, the siege.64 In fact, for many actors, including 
members of the UN protection force, the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
black-market smuggling may have overshadowed the military aspects of the 
siege.65 It has been observed with more than a little irony that Sarajevo, host 
to the 1984 Winter Olympics, only became a globally connected city after it 
was besieged.66 
By agreement between the parties, Serb officials supervised the manifests 
and cargo lists of all in-bound flights.67 They even secured a concession that 
nearly a quarter of the aid delivered be diverted to their own besieging 
forces.68 A further thirty percent of aid deliveries, especially those arriving by 
land, are estimated to have been skimmed off by criminal elements and black 
marketers.69 Still, the Serbs were unable to prevent UN-delivered humanitar-
ian aid intended for the civilian population from being diverted to the Bos-
nian defenders.70 An aid monitor for the UN estimated that more than 
twenty percent of aid went directly to the defending Bosnian armed forces.71 
                                                                                                                      
61. Id. 
62. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 7. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., id. at ix; BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 308. 
65. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at x, 9. 
66. Id. at 3. 
67. Id. at 9. 
68. Id. at 36. 
69. Id. at 43. 
70. Id. at 10. 
71. Id. at 45. 
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The UN High Commissioner for Refugees publicly denied that aid sup-
ported belligerents, but is reported to have privately acknowledged diversion 
and skimming as the price of humanitarian access to Sarajevo.72 
The Serb efforts to seal the city, admittedly at times half-hearted, were 
further compromised by the purportedly neutral UN Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR). According to one account, UNPROFOR convoys regularly 
charged fees to smuggle Bosnian civilians out of the city in armored person-
nel carriers.73 UNPROFOR members also arranged for seats for wealthy or 
well-connected civilians on departing flights and UN forces permitted mili-
tary material, including decisive anti-tank missiles, ammunition, and commu-
nications equipment, to cross the airport tarmac at the edge of the Serb pe-
rimeter into Sarajevo.74 Meanwhile, Ukrainian and Egyptian troops notori-
ously sold off their rations and fuel to Bosnian fighters.75 Members of high-
level governmental delegations reportedly loaded baggage with contraband 
bound for the black market, including a five-member delegation that arrived 
with forty suitcases.76 Perhaps most significantly, UN officials turned a blind 
eye to an eight-hundred meter tunnel, a “public secret” complete with rails, 
which delivered millions of pounds of supplies to the city and its defending 
forces.77 When Serbs shelled the tunnel’s exit, the UN threatened a NATO 
response.78 
NATO intervention later materialized in response to a Serb mortar at-
tack on a Sarajevo market for smuggled goods.79 NATO air strikes dropped 
more than one thousand bombs on Serb positions outside Sarajevo and else-
where.80 The attacks shifted the military balance and forced the Serbs to con-
front the prospect of broader international intervention. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the NATO campaign emboldened the Bosnian Army, encourag-
ing and facilitating offensives in the countryside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Weapons smuggled past the UN embargoes, often by humanitarian front 
agencies, were critical to arming the Bosnian offensives and shifting the mil-
itary balance around Sarajevo.81 By late 1995, the nationalist Serb movement 
                                                                                                                      
72. Id. at 10. 
73. Id. at 47. 
74. Id. at 54. 
75. Id. at 47. 
76. Id. at 49. 
77. Id. at 62; King, supra note 57, at 244, 268. 
78. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 59–60. 
79. King, supra note 57, at 272. 
80. Id. 
81. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 109, 111. 
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consented to talks that culminated in a negotiated end to the siege and the 
broader conflict. 
The Serbs’ precise goals for the siege remain unclear and likely evolved 
as the situation developed. Although submission of Bosnian forces and po-
litical partition were undoubtedly their initial goals, in later stages, especially 
after international attention, it seems the siege served as a holding environ-
ment—a means to prevent foreign military intervention and to distract at-
tention from their military operations and brutal ethnic cleansing campaign 
carried out in rural Bosnia. It is clear, however, that failure to isolate and seal 
the city of Sarajevo from outside support, most especially from international 
humanitarian aid, contributed to the failure of the Serb siege.82 In fact, the 
city and its defenders strengthened as the siege progressed.83 
The importance of isolation is illustrated well by contrasting the failure 
of isolation at Sarajevo with the Serbs’ effective isolation at the siege of Sre-
brenica, an effort now overshadowed by horrific criminal acts of genocide 
that followed the siege. As early as 1993, Bosnian-Serb forces managed to 
cut off Srebrenica from the rest of Bosnia.84 Only three UN relief convoys 
entered Srebrenica in the first year of the conflict.85 Eventually, the Serbs 
prohibited all humanitarian aid convoys in violation of a UN Security Coun-
cil resolution.86 And while small groups managed to smuggle supplies 
through the surrounding forested valleys, no major resupply or relief effort 
reached the besieged Bosnian Muslims.87 The Serbs even blockaded support 
to the UNPROFOR Dutch peacekeeping battalion stationed near Srebren-
ica, rendering it “nonoperational.”88 
While the besieging Serbs never entirely eliminated smuggling and even 
collusion by their own forces, effective physical and psychological isolation 
contributed enormously to the fall of the city. The isolation of Srebrenica 
was calculated and rigorously, if also ruthlessly, enforced. An order from the 
Bosnian-Serb Supreme Command was clear, “create an unbearable situation 
                                                                                                                      
82. King, supra note 57, at 273 (noting Bosnian-Serb failure to seal the Sarajevo airport 
and ground routes entering the besieged city). 
83. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 309–10. 
84. Id. at 321. 
85. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 139. 
86. BALKAN BATTLEGROUNDS, supra note 55, at 323. 
87. Id. at 317. 
88. Id. at 323. 
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of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or relief for the inhabit-
ants of Srebrenica and Zepa.”89 Bosnian Serb sieges of the Croatian cities of 
Dubrovnik and Vukovar also featured comparatively complete physical iso-
lation both geographically and militarily.90 
The operational imperative of isolating enemy forces is not restricted to 
conventional warfare. Recent studies suggest it is equally important to suc-
cess against insurgent and other unconventional forces.91 Counterinsurgency 
strategists increasingly appreciate the relevance, if not the appeal, of siege 
operations. Noted counterinsurgency theorists have concluded, given urban-
ization and recent demographic trends, rural and remote areas will give way 
to cities as the primary battlefields of insurgency.92 Rather than engage in 
costly block-to-block or house-to-house combat to dislodge insurgents, 
counterinsurgents may find sealing off insurgents a more attractive tactic of 
urban warfare. Military officers have called for the U.S. armed forces to res-
urrect and revamp their encirclement doctrine and to emphasize its im-
portance as a distinct form of offensive maneuver warfare—a call inspired 
by recent counterinsurgency experiences.93 
Historical experience is again instructive. In 2002, U.S. forces failed to 
achieve complete physical isolation of encircled Al-Qaeda and Taliban fight-
ers during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan’s Shahikot Valley, the failure 
of which contributed to prolonging the armed conflict.94 In 2004, U.S. forces 
laid siege to Fallujah, Iraq, to defeat newly formed insurgent forces.95 While 
U.S. armor and infantry surrounded the city and even erected dirt berms to 
prevent infiltration, those forces never achieved complete physical isolation. 
                                                                                                                      
89. Id. at 325 (citing evidence presented by the prosecutor at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia trial of General Krstić). 
90. ANDREAS, supra note 56, at 4. 
91. See Scott Thomas, Operational Encirclements: Can the U.S. Military Decisively 
Follow Through? 1–2 (May 21, 2009) (unpublished monograph, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a506229.pdf. Thomas argues through historical 
examples that U.S. military doctrine has relied on firepower in operational situations that 
would have been better served by encirclement operations resulting in more thorough and 
earlier defeats of enemy forces. See generally id. 
92. See, e.g., DAVID KILCULLEN, OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF 
THE URBAN GUERRILLA (2013). 
93. Thomas, supra note 91, at 6. 
94. Id. at 33–36. 
95. DONALD P. WRIGHT & TIMOTHY R. REESE, ON POINT II: TRANSITION TO 
THE NEW CAMPAIGN: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
MAY 2003–JANUARY 2005, at 38–39, 43–44 (2008). 
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In response to mounting media pressure and with a view toward building 
goodwill, the United States permitted humanitarian relief convoys to enter 
Fallujah.96 Relief convoys and ambulances were discovered carrying ammu-
nition, anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons.97 Rather than pursue effective 
isolation, the United States abandoned the siege, transferring responsibility 
to Iraqi units and emboldening the insurgents. 
Several months later U.S. forces returned to Fallujah. While unable to 
seal off smugglers entirely, a stronger effort at isolation preceded the final 
assault of the city.98 This time humanitarian organizations and most media 
were denied access. In addition, the use of force was far less constrained than 
previously, with enormously destructive consequences on infrastructure. Yet 
this second intensified effort in Fallujah achieved the military objectives un-
met by the first. 
Still, the Fallujah campaign revealed a perilous military paradox in coun-
terinsurgency sieges. While siege tactics can avoid or delay the need for costly 
and destructive urban assaults, the static and prolonged nature of sieges un-
dermines a central tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine—winning the sup-
port of the civilian population. As one study notes, “a siege can lead to 
strengthening the level of dependency and control a rebel group has on the 
civilian population.”99 In particular, the study identifies smuggling and “aid 
manipulation” as key contributors to the counterinsurgency siege paradox.100 
Counterinsurgent forces are cautioned to avoid siege operations or to ensure 
the strictest conditions of isolation to speed capitulation and break insurgent 
control of civilian populations.101 
Given the capacity of insurgent groups to blunt conventional forces’ ad-
vantages in resources and firepower, it is not surprising that siege conditions 
                                                                                                                      
96. Gerald De Lira Jr., The Anger of a Great Nation: Operation Vigilant Resolve 
11 (May 4, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, United States Marine Corps, Command and 
Staff College, Marine Corps University), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509 044.pdf. 
97. Pamela Constable, Marines Allowing Emergency Relief Supplies into City, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2004 (noting that Army military police discovered “antiaircraft guns hidden 
in a cargo truck full of grain and grenade launchers hidden in ambulances” and “spotted 
ambulances being used as getaway vehicles for gunmen and for collecting weapons after 
street battles”). 
98. WILLIAM KNARR & ROBERT CASTRO, THE BATTLE FOR FALLUJAH: AL FAJR—THE 
MYTH BUSTER 57 (2009) (describing physical and electronic isolation of Fallujah preceding 
attack). 
99. Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 29, at 80. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 81–82. 
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have featured prominently in the current hostilities in Syria. Despite substan-
tial aid from Russia, including significant air support, Syrian forces have ex-
perienced enormous difficulty dislodging rebel forces from urban areas, in-
cluding neighborhoods in the capital city of Damascus. In Aleppo, escalation 
of the Russian intervention ultimately facilitated full encirclement and capit-
ulation of the rebel force in September 2015.102 The Syrian approach is fright-
eningly reminiscent of the Russian operation in Grozny. In February 2016, 
the regime cut the rebel supply lines into Turkey and trapped nearly 300,000 
civilians with the rebel force.103 The rebels capitulated in December after the 
regime finally sustained its isolation of Eastern Aleppo from all outside sup-
port, including humanitarian aid.104 Only by resort to widespread indiscrim-
inate aerial bombardments, but perhaps more importantly by perfecting their 
encirclement and isolation of rebel forces in Aleppo, has the Syrian regime 
been able to prevail tactically. 
These, and many other historical accounts, confirm what has long been 
understood about the military imperative of isolation during sieges. Absent 
the military resources and will to prosecute costly and physically destructive 
assaults against defending forces, siege operations require absolute isolation 
of the besieged force. As military doctrine increasingly appreciates—and as 
experience confirms—isolation must extend beyond physical isolation to in-
clude psychological and even electronic isolation. Even marginal compro-
mise of any form of isolation reduces the chances of an effective siege. It is 
clear that isolation stands paramount among military considerations in siege. 
Just as it has been foremost in the planning and execution of successful siege 
operations, isolation must be included in evaluations of how law can effec-
tively regulate the conduct of siege. Thus, as the next Part demonstrates, it 
is unsurprising that at the diplomatic conferences that have codified so much 
of the law of war, States have jealously guarded their prerogative to control 
access to besieged areas, retaining nearly unfettered discretion in all but the 
narrowest circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
102. Id. at 79. 
103. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of In-
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III. THE LAW OF WAR AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ACTIONS 
 
The law of war applicable to the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) incorpo-
rates two strains of regulation. A “Hague tradition” restrains targeting oper-
ations and the use of weapons by belligerents, while a “Geneva tradition” 
regulates treatment of persons under the power of a belligerent during armed 
conflict, including wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians.105 Jus in 
bello restraints applicable to military operations that separate civilians from 
support or find them intermingled with military objectives include rules from 
both traditions. 
Hague-tradition obligations applicable to attacks include duties to spare 
certain civilian facilities and to mark buildings not used for military pur-
poses.106 Article 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks “the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among civilians.”107 Further, Article 51(3) provides that direct 
participation in hostilities, such as siege defense, deprives civilians of protec-
tion from targeting,108 while Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks109 
and Article 51(5) prohibits the conflation of separate targets into a single 
military objective.110 
The most significant Hague-tradition provision relevant to encircled or 
isolated civilians is found within Article 54 of AP I, as well as its customary 
                                                                                                                      
105. Neither tradition offers an especially accurate description of the geography of 
treaty negotiation and law of war treaty conferences have rarely heeded the Hague-Geneva 
bifurcation. Nor have the multilateral law of war treaties produced at these conferences 
reliably confined themselves to their respective subject. Many law of war treaties include 
both strains of regulation of the conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land secs. II, I, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [herein-
after 1907 Hague Regulations] (addressing, respectively, targeting and weapons, and pris-
oner of war and treatment of the wounded and sick); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts pts. IV, III, II, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (address-
ing, respectively, targeting and weapons, treatment of the wounded and sick, and prisoners 
of war). Still, the two traditions remain a helpful organizing scheme for law of war study. At 
a minimum, awareness of the Hague-Geneva bifurcation permits a measure of interpretive 
and operational consistency within each tradition. 
106. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 105, art. 27. 
107. AP I, supra note 105, art. 51(2). 
108. Id. art. 51(3). 
109. Id. art. 51(4). 
110. Id. art. 51(5). 
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law incarnation.111 For States Parties to AP I, Article 54 prohibits “starvation 
of civilians as a method of warfare.”112 While the law of war principle of 
distinction generally prohibits attacks on civilians, Article 54 regulates be-
yond attacks, reaching methods of warfare short of attack.113 In this respect, 
it adds an important extension of protections from the general conduct of 
hostilities. Further, Article 54 prohibits destruction of “food-stuffs” and 
other life-sustaining material “indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population.”114 
Article 54 likely reflects customary international law; thus, it is binding 
on non-States Parties to AP I.115 But this assessment should be acknowl-
edged with caution. At present, the precise operational doctrine of the pro-
hibition on civilian starvation is somewhat unclear. For instance, a broad 
reading of Article 54 might suggest that even military operations that inci-
dentally starve civilians are prohibited. Such a view might conclude that Ar-
ticle 54 requires belligerents to permit the evacuation of civilians incidentally 
starved by military operations. 
It is not difficult to appreciate how such a broad understanding of Article 
54 would revolutionize the law applicable to encirclements and consequently 
the military art of siege. Siege operations have long relied on entrapped ci-
vilians to contribute to the depletion of food stores and water that sustain 
                                                                                                                      
111. Id. art. 54; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 5.20, 17.9.2 (identi-
fying a customary variant of the rule prohibiting starvation of civilians as a method of war-
fare). 
112. AP I, supra note 105, art. 54. 
113. See Zen Chang, Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law, 9 CREIGHTON 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 29, 34–36 (2017) (examining the 
jus in bello threshold of attack as a gateway for applying the rules of targeting). 
114. AP I, supra note 105, art. 54. 
115. The United States is not a party to AP I, however, its recent law of war manual 
observes, “Starvation specifically directed against the enemy civilian population . . . is 
prohibited.” DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, at § 5.20.1. The Manual cites 
AP I, Article 54(1) as support. Id. § 5.20.1 n.711. An earlier U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
review of AP I characterized Article 54 as “a new rule.” Memorandum from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, app. 54–56, to Secretary of Defense (May 3, 1985), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_ 
Staff/1985_JCSM_152-85_Review_of_GC_AP_I.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it acceptable, however, 
observing “there is little military need for a modern armed force to retain the option of 
starving the enemy’s civilian population into submission.” Memorandum from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, supra at app. 54. 
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enemy forces to hasten capitulation.116 Complete physical isolation from out-
side support and sustenance is the defining feature of siege. Until recently, 
legal guidance to some armed forces unequivocally authorized forcing civil-
ians to share the resource-deprived fate of encircled enemy forces. For ex-
ample, a 1956 U.S. law of war manual instructed that civilians fleeing sieges 
may be fired on to force their return to the besieged area, although the 2016 
DoD Law of War Manual expressly forbids the use of force to compel civil-
ians to remain in besieged areas.117 The broad interpretation of Article 54 
essentially compels besieging forces to alleviate starvation of not only civil-
ians but also of trapped enemy forces. The latter will inevitably consume 
supplies permitted to enter the besieged area or will be sustained by supplies 
no longer consumed by civilians allowed to evacuate. 
A competing view mitigates the compromised military advantage at-
tendant to the broad view. It limits the prohibition on starvation as a method 
of warfare to operations specifically directed at civilians.118 Under this view, 
only military operations undertaken with the purpose of starving civilians are 
prohibited. Military operations undertaken to starve enemy forces that inci-
dentally starve civilians do not provoke Article 54 or applicable custom. This 
view resorts instead to the law of war principle of proportionality to regulate 
incidental starvation of civilians during siege. Only civilian starvation on a 
scale that is clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage 
of enemy defeat through encirclement and isolation from support or relief is 
prohibited.119 Yet even this narrow interpretation of Article 54 and its cus-
tomary equivalent, greatly limits the militarily essential task of physically iso-
lating enemy forces from life-sustaining supplies when these forces are en-
circled along with civilians. Proportionality would prove an especially strong 
limit on physical isolation when civilian presence is numerically significant in 
relation to enemy military forces and objectives.120 
                                                                                                                      
116. See generally DAVIS, supra note 46 (recounting examples of besieging forces denying 
civilian evacuation to hasten starvation and surrender). 
117. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 44–45. That guidance was 
supplanted by the 2015 DoD Law of War Manual, which expressly forbids the use of 
force to compel civilians to remain in besieged areas. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 27, ¶ 5.19.4.1. The UK manual acknowledges forceful return of civilians to 
besieged areas as an “older customary law practice,” but judges that practice obsolete 
in light of AP I requirements. See UK LOAC MANUAL supra note 27, at 87 n.215. 
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119. Id. 
120. For complete treatment of the issue of law of war provisions applicable to sieges, 
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Alongside Hague-tradition protections from methods of warfare and 
their effects, the law of war includes significant Geneva-tradition protections 
to civilians during siege and other operations that isolate civilian populations 
from vital support. The law of war provisions addressed most directly to 
humanitarian relief operations are found in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
of 1949 (GC IV) and the first of two 1977 Protocols.121 These rules address 
evacuation of civilian populations and access for humanitarian relief actions. 
The Geneva tradition’s most significant contribution to the treatment of 
isolated civilians may be Article 17 of the universally ratified GC IV. Article 
17 addresses both evacuation of civilian populations and the delivery of hu-
manitarian relief. With respect to removal and evacuation, Article 17 states 
that parties “shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal 
from besieged or encircled areas.”122 It is important to realize, however, that 
the duty applies to limited classes of persons.123 In this respect, Article 17 is 
something of an outlier to Part II of GC IV. As a general matter, Part II 
applies to the entire civilian population, without regard to age, sex, or na-
tionality.124 Yet Article 17 makes clear that it benefits only “wounded, sick, 
infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases.”125 Thus, healthy 
adult civilians who are not pregnant or aged are formally outside its ambit of 
protection and may be compelled to remain in an encircled area by either the 
besieged or the besieging force. 
                                                                                                                      
Urban Siege Operations (Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, Research 
and Policy Paper, May 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2013/ 10/CHE-
Project-IHL-and-SC-Practice-concerning-Urban-Siege-Operations.pdf. 
121. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; AP I, supra note 105; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereafter AP II]. The Geneva tradition also regulates situations of belligerent occupation. 
Rules governing the treatment of civilian populations can be found in both the 1907 Hague 
Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. The latter Convention includes relief 
actions in favor of civilians in occupied territory, but its provisions are outside the limited 
scope of this article. See GC IV, supra, arts. 59–62, 108–111. 
122. GC IV, supra note 121, art. 17. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. art. 13 (“The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the 
countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, 
religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.”) 
(emphasis added). 
125. Id. art. 17. 
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The succeeding text of the Article 17 obligation further diminishes its 
humanitarian effect. While it employs the imperative “shall,” the obligation 
is merely to make attempts to agree to conditions under which the limited 
class of persons protected by the Article may be removed. The parties are 
not required to agree to removal or evacuation schemes but merely to en-
deavor to do so. The result is a limited obligation with respect to a narrow 
class of besieged civilians. 
Article 17 also addresses belligerents’ duties with respect to relief opera-
tions. Yet, perhaps predictably, these provisions are as limited and condi-
tional as those addressing evacuation and removal. The narrow class of per-
sons protected is identical; only wounded, sick, infirm, aged persons, chil-
dren, and maternity cases benefit. Moreover, as with its provisions on evac-
uation, parties to a siege are only required to endeavor to permit relief supply 
efforts. Crucially, and consistent with its limited scope and effect, the Article 
refers only to permitting passage of “ministers of all religions,” “medical per-
sonnel,” and “medical equipment.”126 Food, water, and other life-sustaining 
supplies are not within the ambit of Article 17.127 
Article 23 of GC IV complements the narrow Article 17 relief provi-
sions. Also appearing in Part II, Article 23 requires that States admit passage 
of religious articles, medical supplies, and “foodstuffs, clothing, and ton-
ics.”128 But like Article 17, Article 23 does not apply to all civilians, it applies 
only when those consignments are intended for “children under fifteen, ex-
pectant mothers and maternity cases.”129 Moreover, it lifts the obligation to 
admit even these relief supplies when belligerents have “serious reasons for 
fearing: (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination, (b) 
that the control may not be effective, or (c) that a definite advantage may 
accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy.”130 
Article 23 also permits belligerents to condition their consent to speci-
fied relief actions. It explicitly identifies supervision by a protecting power 
as a control measure to prevent misuse by enemy forces.131 Furthermore, the 
party granting permission may “prescribe the technical arrangements under 
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128. Id. art. 23. 
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which passage is allowed,” including the timing, duration, and scale of the 
relief action.132 
Several States later mitigated the limits of Article 23. For States Parties 
to AP I, Article 70(1) protects civilians and guarantees relief much more 
broadly in two important respects. First, it does not limit protection to any 
sub-category of civilians; the entire civilian population enjoys protection.133 
Second, it does not distinguish between forms of humanitarian relief or cat-
egories of supply. It only requires that relief efforts be “humanitarian and 
impartial.”134 
Still, Article 70(1) does not offer an unfettered guarantee of relief. It con-
cludes with the language, “relief actions which are humanitarian and impar-
tial in character and conducted without distinction shall be undertaken, subject 
to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.”135 Notably absent from 
Article 70(1) is the Article 23 requirement that relief actions be permitted 
absent “serious reasons” relating to abuse of access or misrouting of sup-
plies.136 Consent of the belligerent parties appears to be a precondition to 
deliveries of humanitarian relief under Article 70(1). The authority to with-
hold consent is unencumbered by the “serious reasons” limit of the Fourth 
Convention. Non-States Parties to AP I, such as the United States, appear 
to concur with the precondition of consent to humanitarian relief operations 
as an aspect of custom.137 The logic of qualifying discretion to reject relief 
actions under Article 23 of GC IV but not under Article 70(1) of AP I may 
be questioned. Yet it appears States were only willing to abandon the GC IV 
limited scope of relief and protected persons in exchange for discretion to 
permit or reject these broader relief actions during siege. 
The doctrinal upshot is a stunted—and for many—disappointingly inad-
equate rule system for humanitarian relief actions in armed conflict. Perhaps 
as much as any subject of the law of war, the existing rules of relief actions 
invite debate of the bargain struck between humanity and military necessity. 
States’ military legal doctrine evinces concern for the harsh effects of deny-
ing relief actions. For example, the United Kingdom’s law of armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
132. Id. 
133. Article 70(1), in providing “children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and 
nursing mothers,” retains priority of relief, and thus did not abandon the special categories 
found within Article 23 of GC IVentirely. See AP I, supra note 105, art. 70(1). 
134. Id. 
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136. See id. 
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manual instructs, “There is thus, except for those specific consignments cov-
ered by the convention [GC IV, Article 23], no duty to agree to them though 
there is a duty to consider in good faith requests for relief operations.”138 Sim-
ilarly, a privately produced law of war manual completed by the Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University advises, 
“The majority of the Group of Experts were [sic] of the opinion that agree-
ment by a Belligerent Party ought not to be withheld except for valid rea-
sons.”139 Yet, as presently constituted, the law reserves extraordinarily broad 
discretion to reject offers of aid and supports the enormous and historically 
confirmed military import of imposing and maintaining isolation of enemy 
forces during siege operations. 
 
IV. THE OXFORD GUIDANCE 
 
In 2013, on directions from the UN Secretary-General, the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) commissioned the Institute 
for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and the Martin Programme on Human 
Rights for Future Generations at Oxford University to host meetings of ex-
perts and to produce a report on the law governing humanitarian relief op-
erations during armed conflict.140 The report was to focus on the narrow 
issue of withholding consent to offers of impartial humanitarian relief during 
armed conflict.141 The Oxford experts expanded the project into a broader 
survey of how general public international law regulates humanitarian relief 
operations during armed conflict. 
In 2016, the authors delivered the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to 
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict (Guidance).142 The 
authors styled the Guidance as “a non-binding restatement of applicable 
                                                                                                                      
138. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ¶ 9.12.3 (emphasis added). 
139. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICA-
BLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 228 (2010) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL COMMEN-
TARY] (emphasis added). 
140. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
141. Id. 
142. The experts consulted did not agree with all of the conclusions of the Guidance. 
Id. at 3. The two authors had written previously on the subject of law applicable to 
humanitarian relief operations. See Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chara Gillard, Arbitrary 
Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 483 (2016). 
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rules,”143 which “seeks to reflect existing law, and to clarify areas of uncer-
tainty.”144 Its goals and approach are reminiscent of numerous recent legal 
manuals and projects on other law-of-war subjects. Groups of private legal 
experts, advocacy groups, and humanitarian organizations have produced re-
statements and interpretive guidance on a wide range of law of war topics, 
including non-international armed conflict, cyber warfare, direct participa-
tion in hostilities, and precautions in attack.145 Although most of these prod-
ucts widely disclaim authority to make international law, many have proved 
enormously influential on popular understandings of the law, lending clarity 
and refinements to the stubbornly ambiguous work of States. 
At its outset, the Guidance identifies the scope of humanitarian relief ac-
tions considered. It recounts an understanding of relief operations consistent 
with familiar law of war provisions. Relevant relief operations include impar-
tial efforts conducted without adverse distinction to provide “food, water, 
medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, heating fuel, and other 
supplies and related service essential for the survival of a civilian population, 
as well as objects necessary for religious worship.”146 
The Guidance then identifies an assortment of international legal bases 
for States’ responsibility to meet the welfare and needs of civilians generally. 
Purported sources of these obligations include sovereignty, and various 
statements and guidelines issued by UN organizations, as well as widely rat-
ified instruments of international human rights law.147 Significant attention 
or analysis is not devoted to the differences between how these assorted 
sources identify and describe belligerents’ responsibilities. The reader is left 
unsure what remains of general requirements, such as that drawn from the 
notion of sovereignty, in light of more specific requirements. Precisely how 
                                                                                                                      
143. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 3. 
144. Id. at 8. 
145. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTIC-
IPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009); MI-
CHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL 
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 
(2006); HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 139. 
146. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 8–9 (citing AP I, arts. 69–70; AP II, 
arts. 18, 23; GC IV, art. 59). It may be noted, and it is acknowledged in the Guidance, 
that AP I Article 70(1) permits relief operations to give priority to relief for children 
and expectant mothers. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 9. 
147. Id. at 11. 
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obligations, such as those found in human rights instruments or the law of 
war, interact with general obligations of public international law is unclear. 
In particular, the Guidance’s authors do not indicate the precise adjustments 
or accommodations made to general obligations to support civilians during 
conditions of armed conflict. Accordingly, the general sources cited, and the 
observations offered, seem ripe for misapplication or selective citation. In 
this sense, the project may have been better served by the narrower law of 
war-based mandate of OCHA and the Secretary-General. 
The Guidance next addresses provisions of the law of war specifically ap-
plicable to humanitarian relief operations in armed conflict, stating first that, 
as a general matter, consent of the belligerent parties is required to conduct 
humanitarian relief operations.148 With respect to scope, the bilateral nature 
of the consent requirement is emphasized; all “Parties concerned” must 
agree for consent to be effective.149 The Guidance states that the consent re-
quirement applies to the State on whose territory the operation will occur150 
and to parties exercising effective control over foreign territory.151 It is noted 
correctly, however, that consent is not required in cases of belligerent occu-
pation or where humanitarian relief has been mandated by the UN Security 
Council.152 
Turning to the Geneva tradition, the Guidance provides Article 23 of GC 
IV and Article 70 of AP I as the primary law of war sources applicable to 
relief actions.153 It refers to an International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) assertion that both provisions reflect customary international law, 
and are therefore binding on non-States Parties to the latter treaty.154 It is not 
clear whether the authors shared this assessment; the Guidance merely states 
these provisions “are considered customary.”155 Regardless, there is reason 
to doubt the ICRC conclusion at least with respect to the views of the United 
States. The 2016 U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual confines 
                                                                                                                      
148. Id. at 16 (citing AP I, art. 70(1)). 
149. Id. (citing AP I, art. 70(1)). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 18 (citing GC IV, art. 59 and assorted UN Security Council resolutions from 
1991 through 2014). 
153. Id. at 34. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 26 n.55, 31 n.64. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
its treatment of relief actions to the obligations of Article 23, with no men-
tion of Article 70.156 
The most important work of the authors, indeed the central query posed 
to them from OCHA, involves the question of when belligerent parties may 
withhold their consent to offers of humanitarian relief operations. Put 
simply, the response of the Guidance is that belligerent parties may not arbi-
trarily withhold consent.157 It identifies three bases for the prohibition: “(i) 
the need to provide an interpretation of the relevant treaty texts, which gives 
effect to all aspects of those provisions; (ii) the drafting history of those pro-
visions; and (iii) practice subsequent to the adoption of the treaties.”158 
The first basis essentially maintains that a textual predicament compels a 
prohibition on arbitrarily withheld consent. The use of the plural terms 
“treaty texts” and “provisions” in the Guidance may suggest textual tension 
arising from multiple sources. Yet, with respect to international armed con-
flict, the alleged textual difficulty does not arise between separate treaty re-
gimes, as is sometimes the case with public international law. Nor does it 
arise between separate law of war treaties, nor even between articles in a 
single treaty.159 The authors of the Guidance allege the predicament arises 
within a clause of a single article, namely Article 70(1) of AP I, which pro-
vides in relevant part, “[R]elief actions which are humanitarian and impartial 
in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, 
subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.”160 
The authors maintain that the Article 70(1) simultaneous resort to the 
term “shall,” and the phrase “subject to the agreement of” provokes an in-
terpretive quandary. It is asserted that to give legal effect to both terms, as 
accepted canons of interpretation require, “shall” must be regarded as having 
a limiting effect on the condition of agreement reserved in the latter clause 
                                                                                                                      
156. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, §§ 5.19.3, 5.19.3.1. The earlier 
review of AP I by the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that AP I Article 70 was acceptable 
subject to the understanding that relief actions could be refused due to “imperative 
considerations of military necessity.” Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supra 
note 115, at 72–73. That review also noted the president of the United States holds 
statutory authority to withhold relief supplies that “endanger the Armed Forces of the 
United States which are engaged in hostilities.” Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)). 
157. OXFORD GUIDANCE, note 28, at 16, 20, 21, 
158. Id. at 21. 
159. The Guidance identifies a similar textual dilemma with respect to non-international 
armed conflict arising from Article 18(2) of AP II. Id. 
160. Id. (emphasis added). 
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of Article 70(1).161 They explain, “use of the word ‘shall’ . . . suggests that 
acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely discretionary.”162 As under-
stood in the Guidance, the term “shall” prevents parties from enjoying full 
discretion when weighing whether to agree to a relief action or not. 
A host of interpretive considerations calls into question whether this 
reading is compelled or even correct. First, there is reason to wonder 
whether the textual difficulty presented by Article 70(1) is overstated in the 
Guidance. Other sources that have analyzed Article 70(1) have not dwelled on 
or remarked significantly on any such internal tension. The quite thorough 
analysis of an ICRC commentary on AP I does not explicitly identify any 
such difficulty.163 Nor do military legal manuals of States, including States 
Parties to AP I such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, identify 
difficulty reconciling internal textual tension with respect to Article 70(1).164 
States appear to have settled on a meaning that evinces neither concern for 
textual tension nor compels the elaboration with respect to arbitrariness of-
fered in the Guidance. In this respect, the Guidance appears something of a 
“refusal of closure”—a wish to revisit an issue that is, from many appear-
ances, settled.165 
A second concern arises from the sequencing employed in the Guidance 
to resolve the claimed textual predicament. The text “shall” and “subject to 
the agreement of” appear in that order in Article 70(1).166 Yet the Guidance 
reverses that order in its effort to interpret those terms, stating: 
 
As already discussed, the last phrase makes clear that consent is required. 
However, the use of the word “shall” also suggests that acceptance of hu-
manitarian relief is not entirely discretionary. Interpreting the texts in a 
                                                                                                                      
161. Id. (citing the principle of effectiveness as exercised by the International Court of 
Justice in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 70, ¶¶ 133–
34 (Apr. 1)). 
162. Id. at 21. 
163. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 2790–2822 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
164. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (2001) [hereinafter CA-
NADIAN LOAC MANUAL]; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Germany), ZDV 15/2, LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN LOAC MANUAL]; UK LOAC 
MANUAL, supra note 27. 
165. ROWAN WILLIAMS, ANGLICAN IDENTITIES 79 (2004). 
166. AP I, supra note 105, art. 70(1). 
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manner which insists on the requirement of consent, but which subjects 
such consent to some limits, gives effect to both aspects of the provision.167 
 
Note that the Guidance first indicates that Article 70(1) establishes a base-
line rule that only consensual humanitarian relief is required. This is not itself 
objectionable. However, the authors then seek to account for how the term 
“shall” modifies the discretion to render or withhold consent. One supposes 
that term might have been interpreted to eliminate parties’ discretion entirely 
and the compulsory nature of the term suggests as much. Of course, such 
an understanding would deprive the term “agreement” of its ordinary mean-
ing. Thus, the meaning of “shall” is instead softened, regarding it as elimi-
nating arbitrarily withheld consent. Considered in this sequence—that is, out 
of the order in which the terms appear—the interpretation set forth in the 
Guidance seems indeed a reasonable compromise or reconciliation of ten-
sion.168 However, neither “agreement” nor “shall” enjoys its full, plain mean-
ing; each is simply accounted for in a manner that best fits that interpretation. 
The authors of the Guidance adopted a reverse-order interpretation to 
avoid rendering any part of the text redundant or meaningless.169 Reading 
Article 70(1) non-sequentially might be commended or even necessary if a 
natural sequential reading presented a difficulty with respect to redundancy 
or rendered any text a nullity. But this is not the case with Article 70(1). A 
simple, sequential reading and interpretation approaches the terms in pre-
cisely the order they appear and gives each term its full meaning. Under that 
interpretation the term appearing first, in this case the term “shall,” estab-
lishes the Article’s general or baseline obligation. The compulsory nature of 
“shall” indicates a mandatory character. The drafters of Article 70(1) did not 
leave that term unmodified, however, as the phrase “subject to the agree-
ment of” follows. A plain reading of “agreement” indicates discretion to 
consent or not to consent is permitted. While the term “subject to” both 
indicates that affirmative exercise of discretion is required and, more im-
portantly, that any preceding obligations, including any obligations flowing 
from the term “shall” are conditioned by agreement of the belligerent parties. 
                                                                                                                      
167. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21. 
168. The authors introduce their non-sequential reading of Article 70(1) in an ar-
ticle addressing the subject of arbitrary withholding of consent. Akande & Gillard, supra 
note 142, at 489. They explain, “While the last phrase makes clear that consent is required, 
the use of the word ‘shall’ also suggests that acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely 
discretionary.” Id. 
169. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21. 
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This natural reading does not, as the Guidance authors seem to fear, ren-
der the term “shall” a nullity. The compulsory meaning of the term is re-
tained if one understands it to mean that the belligerent parties are required 
to permit relief actions they have approved. That is, parties shall permit those 
relief actions agreed to between themselves. By this reading, Article 70(1) 
stands as a sort of guarantee that parties will permit humanitarian relief op-
erations that they have considered to be consistent with the needs of their 
military circumstances—a sense of pact sunt servanda with respect to humani-
tarian relief consent. Once a party determines it is willing and able to permit 
a relief action in its territory or in territory under its effective control, it is 
bound to support and to allow that action to proceed. 
In fact, precisely this understanding of Article 70 appears in a later sec-
tion of the Guidance where it is stated, “[o]nce consent has been granted, 
parties to an armed conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded 
passage of humanitarian relief supplies, equipment, and personnel through-
out the territory under their effective control.”170 This same natural reading 
of Article 70(1) appears again in the section concerning medical relief sup-
plies, equipment, and personnel: “Accordingly, provided consent has been 
granted, parties to an international armed conflict and other relevant states 
have an absolute obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded pas-
sage of medical relief supplies and equipment.”171 
Rather than provoking textual tension that calls for a non-sequential in-
terpretation and resulting obligation, the “shall” of Article 70(1) simply ex-
presses and reinforces the binding nature of consent rendered to relief ac-
tions. Such a guarantee permits relief organizations to rely on the parties’ 
consent, to undertake preparations for these operations, and to execute these 
actions during armed conflict. Meanwhile, by this reading, the phrase “sub-
ject to the agreement of” retains its essential meaning—that of involving 
approval or acceptance and the imperative, mandatory meaning of “shall” is 
simultaneously preserved. 
Further doubt may be cast on the Guidance’s interpretation of Article 
70(1) in light of its regulatory consequences. It is not only an overwrought, 
non-sequential reading; it is a reading that identifies through implication, ra-
ther than through clearly expressed textual consent, a limit on State prerog-
ative and therefore sovereignty. Withholding agreement to relief operations 
inconsistent with the authors’ interpretation of Article 70(1) is regarded as 
                                                                                                                      
170. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Later in the Guidance, the passage is reproduced without 
the reference to territorial control. Id. at 29. 
171. Id. at 34. 
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an internationally wrongful act.172 Yet foundational precepts of international 
law counsel against such analyses. In S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice (PCIJ), predecessor of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), cautioned that restrictions on States must not be presumed.173 The 
natural reading of Article 70(1) adheres more closely to the Court’s caution 
in this respect. It avoids generating or implying a new restriction on States, 
while giving full effect to each term of Article 70(1). 
Finally, with respect to the text of Article 70(1), the interpretation offered 
in the Guidance is a clumsy form for States to have expressed a requirement 
not to arbitrarily withhold consent. It seems highly unlikely that drafters and 
States expected consumers of Article 70(1) to apprehend such a requirement 
through plain reading. Moreover, there are certainly simpler ways for States 
to have expressed what the Guidance implies is there. Had States meant to 
modify or limit their discretion to approve or disapprove relief operations, 
they could easily have done so. In fact, they did so previously in Article 23 
of GC IV with respect to medical and religious supplies for a narrow class 
of civilians, conditioning refusal of such relief on “serious reasons” to sus-
pect misuse. Article 23 explicitly requires the precise reasoned refusals that 
the Guidance authors contrive for Article 70(1). States adopted an even clearer 
obligation with respect to humanitarian relief for situations of belligerent oc-
cupation. Article 59 of GC IV indicates occupying powers “shall agree to 
relief schemes on behalf of the [occupied] population.”174 
As a second basis for the prohibition on arbitrary withholding of con-
sent, the Guidance offers “the negotiating history of the Additional Proto-
cols”—statements made by States’ representatives during debates at the dip-
lomatic conference that formed Article 70(1). The Guidance asserts the States 
party to those negotiations understood they would not have complete free-
dom to withhold consent and could only do so for valid reasons.175 
                                                                                                                      
172. Id. at 48 (“Unlawful impeding of humanitarian relief operations is a violation 
of international humanitarian law and often also of international human rights law that 
gives rise to responsibility under international law.”). 
173. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). In a 
similar vein, the Permanent Court of International Justice cautioned against interpret-
ing broadly treaty provisions that limit State sovereignty. See JAMES CRAWFORD, 
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (8th ed. 2012) (citing 
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 261 (Sept. 10). 
174. GC IV, supra note 121, art. 59. 
175. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21. 
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Resort to negotiating history, or travaux préparatoires, to interpret treaties 
is widely practiced, but it is best understood as a supplementary rather than 
a primary means of interpretation. For instance, the ICJ does not consult 
negotiating histories as a matter of routine. It limits resort to negotiating 
histories to cases of pressing textual ambiguity or to instances where ordinary 
meanings of treaty text give rise to unreasonable results.176 The ICJ has ob-
served, “If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make 
sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.”177 The Court has rejected 
calls to consider negotiating history when natural or ordinary readings of 
treaties render clear understandings.178 
Because the Guidance chooses to create textual tension within Article 
70(1), it is perhaps unsurprising that the authors resort to the negotiating 
history of that Article as a means of interpretation. Whether, or the extent 
to which, one accepts the negotiating history as appropriate to understanding 
Article 70(1) is then a reflection of one’s opinion of the initial claim in the 
Guidance that the Article is textually ambiguous. 
The Guidance is not alone in resort to legislative records with respect to 
Article 70(1). Like the Guidance, the ICRC’s Commentary on AP I relies on 
negotiating history to interpret Article 70(1).179 Both the Guidance and the 
ICRC Commentary emphasize a passage from the Official Records of the diplo-
matic conference by the German delegate Professor Michael Bothe: “[Article 
70] did not imply that the Parties concerned had absolute and unlimited free-
dom to refuse their agreement to relief actions. A Party refusing its agree-
ment must do so for valid reasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones.”180 
                                                                                                                      
176. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. Article 32 states: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
. . . when the interpretation [in accordance with the ordinary meaning] . . . leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure . . . .” 
Id. 
177. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 8 (Mar. 3). 
178. Id. (rejecting submissions calling on the Court to consider the negotiating history 
where the Court found, “no difficulty in ascertaining the natural and ordinary meaning of 
the words in question and no difficulty in giving effect to them.”). 
179. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 163, ¶ 2805. 
180. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21 (quoting 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA 
1974–1977, at 336, ¶ 27 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS]. 
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However, Professor Bothe, who would later publish his own commentary 
on AP I, and, incidentally, was a member of the group of experts that advised 
the Guidance authors, appears to have conceded in his remarks that Article 
70 did not limit discretion to reject aid to the extent he had hoped. He indi-
cated that his delegation accepted the Article 70(1) passage requiring agree-
ment of the belligerent parties, “in a spirit of compromise.”181 
Other delegations endorsed the German view, including the United 
States, Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, but none 
was willing to insist on treaty language to that effect.182 The Swiss representa-
tive also indicated his delegation preferred to delete the phrase “subject to 
the agreement of the Parties.”183 Presumably, it was the unfettered discretion 
to withhold consent indicated by the unqualified term “agreement” that con-
cerned the Swiss. Yet the Swiss delegation ultimately declined to insist on or 
propose any such measure. And although the meeting considered and 
adopted other amendments to what became Article 70(1), no State offered 
any amendment to incorporate Professor Bothe’s understanding or the Swiss 
preference into the text of the Article. Nor did any State submit an under-
standing to the effect of the German statement upon ratification. 
Further examination of the AP I Official Records and earlier records reveals 
a still more complicated negotiating history. An earlier draft, negotiated at a 
conference of experts that preceded the diplomatic conference, obliged bel-
ligerent parties to accept relief actions “to the fullest extent possible.”184 A 
subsequent draft, considered at a second conference of experts, actually 
dropped the qualifying phrase entirely, expressing an absolute duty, com-
mensurate with the duty attendant to situations of belligerent occupation. It 
required States accept relief actions and only gave belligerents discretion to 
prescribe technical arrangements such as timing.185 Yet at the succeeding dip-
lomatic conference, States rejected both arrangements. 
                                                                                                                      
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1 REPORT ON THE WORK 
OF THE CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIR-
MATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE 
IN ARMED CONFLICTS, SECOND SESSION, 3 MAY – 3 JUNE 1972, at 161 (1972) (repro-
ducing Draft Article 64 and recording experts’ reactions thereto). 
185. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949: COMMENTARY 78 
(1973) (reproducing Draft Article 62 concerning relief actions). 
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As late as 1976, the third year of the four-year diplomatic conference, 
the draft of Article 70(1) included an unqualified duty to accept humanitarian 
relief. For example, the 1973 draft additional protocol prepared by the ICRC 
and submitted to the diplomatic conference read in relevant part: “the Parties 
to the conflict shall agree to and facilitate those relief actions which are ex-
clusively humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any 
adverse distinction.”186 And after a first round of amendments by States, that 
portion of the draft article read: “each party to the conflict shall agree to, and 
shall facilitate relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character 
and conducted exclusively for the civilian population without any adverse 
distinction.”187 
However, States ultimately insisted that the general obligation to permit 
relief actions be contingent on agreement by the belligerent parties. A work-
ing group assigned to address the draft humanitarian relief articles reported 
a split among delegations. Some delegations advocated a “clearly defined ob-
ligation with respect to relief.”188 Others maintained “such an obligation 
could not be imposed.”189 The working group reported that to reconcile 
these views, the draft of Article 70 was “re-worded to state that relief actions 
should be carried out in accordance with agreements concluded between the 
Parties . . . .”190 The result was the condition of agreement in the final version 
of Article 70(1). 
If one is to concede the propriety of resorting to travaux préparatoires, se-
lective citations should usually be avoided. A fuller consideration of the 
travaux reveals that the selection of the authors of both the ICRC Commentary 
and the Guidance underemphasize the importance to the majority of assem-
bled States of preserving sovereign prerogative during armed conflict and 
specifically during siege. 
The third basis for a prohibition on arbitrary withholding of consent 
concerns “practice subsequent to the adoption of the treaties.”191 The Guid-
                                                                                                                      
186. 1 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 180, pt. III, at 20. 
187. Amendments to Draft Protocol I, Article 62, in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 
180, at 282–83. The co-sponsors of this amended version included Austria, Canada, 
Demark, Finland, France, Greece, Holy See, Indonesia, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. 
188. 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 180, at 333 (reporting on Working Group B of 
Committee III at the Fourth Session of the Diplomatic Conference). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 21. 
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ance asserts “subsequent formulations of the rules of humanitarian assis-
tance” expressly indicate States may not arbitrarily withhold consent.192 It is 
true that accepted rules of treaty interpretation include subsequent practice 
as evidence of meaning.193 Usually, such practice is confined to evidence of 
actual application of the treaty obligation in question. 
To the author’s credit, the Guidance refers to “practice,” not to State prac-
tice, presumably so as not to overstate its significance to the formation of 
custom. Accordingly, it directs readers to an Institute of International Law 
resolution, a draft article on disasters by the International Law Commission, 
and various statements by UN organs, including non-binding observations 
of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the Human Rights 
Committee. None of these sources, of course, constitutes subsequent State 
practice. Rather, the sources cited in the Guidance are, like the Guidance itself, 
pronouncements by private or international organizations and their organs, 
many addressing situations outside armed conflict. And on closer examina-
tion, none of these sources relies in any significant respect on rigorous or 
systematic effort to discern consistent and substantially uniform State prac-
tice that might inform or modify the meaning of any treaty. Accordingly, the 
subsequent practice offered in the Guidance provides thin, if any, primary ev-
idence of application of States’ international obligations with respect to relief 
actions during armed conflict. 
A more orthodox case might have been made concerning subsequent 
practice by resorting to select States’ military legal manuals. The Canadian 
manual on the law of armed conflict observes, “The parties to a conflict are 
obliged to facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, 
equipment and personnel.”194 Yet on closer examination, it is clear that this 
passage describes the duty with respect to vulnerable classes of the civilian 
population set forth in Article 23 of GC IV. The passage includes no citation 
to Article 70 of AP I, although Canada is a State Party to that instrument.195 
The German manual on the law of armed conflict instructs, “States through 
which relief supplies are moved may object to the transit for objective rea-
sons only.”196 However, this passage seems more clearly directed to the case 
of transit territorial States not party to the conflict than to belligerents. The 
preceding passage confirms as much, addressing obligations of “a Party to a 
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195. Id. 
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conflict” and emphasizing deliveries are “subject to the agreement of the 
Parties.”197 The German distinction between the duty of territorial transit 
States and that of belligerents involved in armed conflict is not clear from 
the law. It may, however, be premised on the comparatively minimal burden 
and risk presented to mere transit States not involved in operations to com-
pel an enemy force into submission. 
After the case is made for a prohibition on arbitrary withholding of con-
sent to humanitarian relief operations, the Guidance offers three indications 
of arbitrariness for purposes of Article 70(1) when consent is withheld: “(i) 
in circumstances that result in the violation by a state of its obligations under 
international law with respect to the civilian population in question; (ii) [that] 
violates the principles of necessity and proportionality; (iii) that is unreason-
able, unjust, lacking in predictability, or that is otherwise inappropriate.”198 
The first indication of arbitrariness points chiefly to other law of war 
provisions, including the prohibition of starvation as a method of war, par-
ties’ medical treatment obligations, and the prohibition on collective punish-
ment.199 It also calls for examination of obligations outside the law of war. 
The Guidance states that the internationally wrongful act of arbitrarily with-
holding consent to relief operations occurs when doing so violates human 
rights obligations such as bodily integrity, economic, cultural, and social 
rights, and an adequate standard of living.200 
A complicated and contentious body of scholarship and State practice 
has developed around the fraught question of how international human 
rights and the law of war interact during armed conflict.201 However, sub-
stantial agreement has formed around the notion that, although armed con-
flict does not extinguish human rights obligations, human rights provisions 
                                                                                                                      
197. Id. 
198. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 22. 
199. Id. at 23. 
200. Id. It is reasonable to assume this provision with respect to arbitrariness is 
intended to apply to other international obligations outside the law of war such as those 
derived from sovereignty and other general international law provisions. See id. at 11. 
201. See Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 657, 662–65 
(Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014) (cataloging a wide range of viewpoints on 
the interface between international human rights law and the law of war); David 
Kretzmer, Rotem Giladi & Yuval Shany, International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law: Exploring Parallel Application, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 306 (2007) 
(introducing several papers presented at a conference addressing the interface between 
human rights and the law of war published in the same volume). 
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yield to or are informed by more specific regulation by the law of war—the 
doctrine of lex specialis.202 The ICJ applied lex specialis considerations when it 
evaluated claims that nuclear weapon use might constitute a violation of the 
human right against the arbitrary deprivation of life.203 The Court advised 
that, during armed conflict, what constitutes an arbitrary deprival of life for 
human rights purposes should be determined by reference to the law of war, 
specifically the principles of discrimination and humanity.204 
Like the ICJ, the Guidance authors attempt to reconcile how human rights 
and law of war rules might operate in a complementary fashion during armed 
conflict. Specifically, they attempt to account simultaneously for how human 
rights law and the law of war guarantee human survival and sustenance dur-
ing siege. But whether by error, or by a clever turn, the comment on arbi-
trariness departs from the ICJ’s application of the doctrine of lex specialis. 
Where the Court, acknowledging the law of war as law specifically crafted 
for armed conflict, sought to understand a human right through, or by ref-
erence to, the law of war, the Guidance does precisely the opposite. In the 
Guidance, the authors seek to discern the extent of a law of war provision by 
reference to assorted human rights norms. More precisely, it is asserted that 
arbitrariness, for purposes of the law of war applicable to relief actions, is 
determined by reference to human rights law obligations with respect to bod-
ily integrity, economic, cultural, and social rights, and a standard of living. 
Where the ICJ limited and qualified a human right by reference to the law of 
war, the Guidance authors expand a law of war prohibition by reference to 
human rights law. 
The approach in the Guidance to lex specialis not only reverses the appli-
cation of that doctrine, it also presents a strained narrative of the relationship 
between human rights law and law of war applicable to relief actions. Article 
70(1), adopted subsequent to each of the referenced human rights norms, pre-
sumably reflects States’ judgment that hostilities introduce considerations 
                                                                                                                      
202. See David Glazier, Zora Colakovic, Alexandra Gonzalez & Zacharias 
Tripodes, Failing Our Troops: A Critical Assessment of the Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual, 42 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215, 262–63 (2017) (concurring 
with application of lex specialis, however, contesting the United States’ broad conception 
of the doctrine); Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 
648, 655–56 (2007) (discussing various approaches to the operation of the doctrine of 
lex specialis). 
203. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (8 July). 
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not accounted for in peacetime regulation of access to humanitarian relief. 
Had the preexisting human rights rules cited in the Guidance been applicable 
to armed conflict and considered adequate, there would have been little call 
for Article 70(1). Yet, the Guidance has the effect of leveling out the interna-
tional regulation of relief access in times of peace and times of armed con-
flict. It effectively incorporates these human rights norms by reference in a 
way that Article 70(1) might have, but clearly did not. A sounder approach 
accepts States’ apparent judgment that conditions of armed conflict warrant 
greater discretion for States’ decisions to accept or reject offers of relief and 
require a specific regime of regulation apart from general, chiefly peacetime 
obligations. 
The second indication of arbitrariness in the Guidance refers to the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality. It is not entirely clear whether this is 
meant to refer to law of war principles or principles of general public inter-
national law. Necessity and proportionality are expressed in a variety of in-
ternational legal regimes.205 The possibility of reference to principles of gen-
eral public international law is at least suggested by a citation to a UN Human 
Rights Committee communication and a UN Secretary-General report on 
human rights and deprivation of nationality.206 Blurring somewhat the dis-
tinction between the two principles, it is explained that withheld consent that 
“exceeds what is necessary in the circumstances . . . is thus disproportion-
ate,”207 which, in the view of the Guidance authors, amounts to prohibited 
arbitrariness. 
It is widely understood that law of war principles convey specific mean-
ing. For example, the law of war principle of necessity has been defined to 
permit 
 
                                                                                                                      
205. See Attila Tanzi, Necessity, State of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1071 (describing the legal doctrine of necessity 
under State responsibility); see also Emily Crawford, Proportionality, in supra, (May 2011), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e14 59 (describing a “general principle” of proportionality that exists 
within public international law). 
206. OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 24 n.52 (citing A v. Australia, Comm. 
No. 560/1993, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 
(Apr. 30, 1997); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and 
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a state engaged in armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, 
not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in 
order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete 
or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest moment with the mini-
mum expenditure of life and resources.208 
 
Meanwhile, law of war proportionality includes at least two and perhaps as 
many as three meanings. The U.S. Law of War Manual indicates that propor-
tionality “may be defined as the principle that even where one is justified in 
acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive.”209 While 
the German Law of Armed Conflict Manual defines a narrower notion of pro-
portionality applicable to attacks: “attacks on military objectives which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination of these, which and would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated are pro-
hibited.”210 
Each of these meanings, but most especially the jus in bello variant of 
proportionality applicable to attacks, has been refined to account for the 
unique challenges and circumstances of armed conflict. Even if the Guidance 
is understood as confining an indication of arbitrariness to the law of war 
principles of necessity and proportionality, it is unclear why the law of war 
should be interpreted to include a separate legal obligation with respect to 
arbitrariness when it comes to humanitarian relief. It is especially unclear 
why the interpretation offered in the Guidance should be employed to identify 
a redundant norm. To be sure, too much should not be made of this obser-
vation. The law of war is rife with specific regulations that implement, refine, 
or give effect to law of war principles. But evidence of such obligations and 
their acceptance by States should be overwhelmingly clear rather than im-
plied through interpretive dexterity. 
The third indication of prohibited arbitrariness identified in the Guidance 
includes withheld consent that is “unreasonable or that may lead to injustice 
or to lack of predictability, or that is otherwise inappropriate.”211 This pas-
sage gives rise to at least two concerns. First, it is difficult to evaluate justice 
and predictability as law of war requirements. No law of war instrument 
                                                                                                                      
208. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ¶ 2.2; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
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elaborates on either as a general requirement of the conduct of belligerents 
during hostilities. Nor do the military legal manuals of States or other widely 
consulted sources include significant treatment of justice and predictability 
as either independent law of war obligations or as bellwethers of sound law 
of war implementation. 
Second, the Guidance does not elaborate on either concept and only sur-
mises, “a total failure to provide reasons for withholding consent,” as a pos-
sible example of arbitrariness for purposes of Article 70(1).212 It is troubling 
to equate belligerent parties’ silence on military decision making with arbi-
trariness. A number of considerations, other than arbitrariness of reasoning 
can explain failure to provide public explanations of military courses of ac-
tion. The intense pace and changing nature of battlefield conditions often 
prevent belligerents from regularly offering timely and cogent explanations 
for their conduct. Belligerents face notorious challenges even coordinating 
decisions internally and suffer routine failures in this respect, despite best 
efforts and enormous incentives to improve. These challenges are multiplied 
and exacerbated with respect to their external communications. It is also well 
understood that military planning and execution require secrecy to guarantee 
operational security. And although many armed forces include public affairs 
organizations, the military organizations that are most privy to the rationales 
for decisions are rarely the primary outlets for communicating States’ day-
to-day legal positions. 
Further, there is textually-based cause to doubt the requirement set forth 
in the Guidance that parties must provide reasons for withholding consent. 
To apply the concern expressed by the authors for the doctrine of effective-
ness,213 a distinction should be made between the text of Article 23 of GC 
IV and Article 70(1) of AP I. As noted above, where the latter is silent as to 
reasoning for withholding consent, the former explicitly requires “serious 
reasons,” thus limiting conditions under which belligerents may reject re-
lief.214 To imply a reasoning requirement in AP I, where none appears, argu-
ably renders the Article 23 requirement a nullity. That AP I supplements the 
1949 Geneva Conventions commends all the more interpreting it with a view 
to consistency with those Conventions.215 
The requirement of reasoned refusal raises further concerns of a practi-
cal nature. This concern is borne out especially by the following conclusion 
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from the Guidance: “Withholding consent without providing any reasons 
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of arbitrariness.”216 Rebuttal presump-
tions are familiar and widely accepted in the controlled environment of liti-
gation. However, they have proved controversial in law of war instru-
ments—often for good reason. The burden shifting schemes associated with 
presumptions and their rebuttal by evidence, while manageable in civil and 
ordinary criminal litigation, prove enormously difficult in the chaotic atmos-
phere and aftermath of combat operations. Requiring parties to record and 
publish their reasons for refusing relief actions introduces a new burden on 
belligerent parties—likely a cost not anticipated at the time these obligations 
were negotiated. And it is unclear why the party refusing agreement to a relief 
action should bear the burden of rebuttal rather than requiring the party al-
leging an unlawful impediment to make a prima facie showing. 
Other evidentiary concerns attend the arbitrariness prohibition. It is pos-
sible that the standard for refusal of consent was not specified by States be-
cause States realized that proof of arbitrariness would be too difficult to en-
force. There is a further question whether the refinements in the Guidance 
with respect to arbitrariness merely shift debate from the straightforward 
question of consent to the more complicated and convoluted question of 
adequacy of reasoning and sufficiency of proof. 
In most cases, the conclusion that a party had arbitrarily withheld its 
consent only could be determined based on the totality of circumstances. 
Military decisionmaking, viewed from an outside or non-indoctrinated per-
spective, might often seem arbitrary. Further, military planning and decision 
making frequently involve judgments made with imperfect or inadequate in-
formation. Relevant circumstances would certainly include observable bat-
tlefield conditions. Yet just as relevant—and perhaps even more so—would 
be facts not available either to opposing parties or the public. 
Finally, an evaluation of the Guidance requires broader consideration of 
its place in and impact on the development and methodology of the law of 
war. While States have made important progress in humanizing war through 
law, that law remains in important respects incomplete. It is rife with seeming 
gaps in protection and in logic. Experience in war repeatedly highlights the 
humanitarian deficiencies of the law of war. Whether these gaps or failings 
represent invitations to achieve through interpretation and logic what could 
not be accomplished in negotiations between States or whether they are 
merely reflections of the limits of international consensus and therefore of 
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the prevailing balance between humanity and necessity is a critical consider-
ation for any law of war analysis. 
At the end of the nineteenth century and into the opening decades of 
the twentieth, the law of war experienced a brief golden age of codification. 
Beginning with a flurry of succinct treaties addressing discrete jus in bello sub-
jects, States regulated the initiation, conduct, and termination of hostilities 
between themselves.217 Their enthusiasm for codification, and also it seems 
for compliance with the international law of war, soon waned. Neither two 
world wars nor endless internal armed conflicts in the mid-twentieth century 
managed to inspire States to develop a comprehensive international law of 
war. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and UN Charter certainly reflect im-
portant commitments to international law by States, each prompted in large 
part by States’ experience in armed conflict.218 Yet the Geneva Conventions 
and the UN Charter left important aspects of the conduct of hostilities and 
resort to force either untreated or underdeveloped. 
The closing decades of the twentieth century saw something of a resur-
gence in codification, perhaps even a second, albeit lethargic and sporadic, 
golden age. In addition to robust updates to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
the period between 1972 and 2000 saw new jus in bello treaties on targeting 
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and conventional weapons, as well as underappreciated law of war codifica-
tions in the form of war crimes treaties.219 
But in the opening decades of the twenty-first century, international legal 
momentum again seems to have stalled. The ICRC, long an initiator of law 
of war development, presently does not have public plans to sponsor a com-
prehensive law of war treaty conference. Currently, its most significant legal 
project is an effort to update and reissue its previous commentaries on the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols.220 Meanwhile, States’ 
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diplomatic attention is chiefly invested in narrow weapons issues.221 Yet, 
State support for these contentious regulatory efforts is far short of the uni-
versal support enjoyed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
If law of war development can be described as fitful, the same cannot be 
said for its subject. Rapid evolutions and even revolutions in warfare have 
been a constant.222 New means, methods, and venues of warfare emerge with 
regularity. Science and military art continually push conflict in new directions 
and even into new domains. 
The challenge of pairing static law with dynamic conditions of combat is 
not new. But during hiatuses in law of war development, such as the present, 
these efforts gain increased importance. Lulls in treaty development involve 
law of war implementation less as a matter of application and more as a mat-
ter of interpretation. The effort, such as that undertaken by the legal experts 
who participated in the preparation of the Guidance, to identify precise rules 
of conduct for emerging conditions in war becomes more difficult as they 
grow removed in time and context from the law.223 While law of war princi-
ples such as distinction and humanity are in some senses timeless, assessing 
precisely what rules of conduct each principle demands in a new domain or 
context of warfare or from new military technology is no simple matter. 
Alongside efforts to form operative law for conditions of armed conflict, 
law of war implementation has involved a second, perhaps more subtle en-
deavor—an effort to reconcile that operative law to the fundamental pur-
poses of the law of war. Law of war analyses, such as the Oxford Guidance, 
reveal not only their authors’ preferences and habits of interpretation, they 
also offer veiled (and not-so veiled) comments on the suitability of the law 
of war—how well or poorly the extant law vindicates its purposes. That is, 
law of war interpretation involves both assessments of how the law applies 
to new conduct in war, as well as appraisals of how well resulting rules of 
conduct match prevailing senses of humanity and military necessity. 
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The law of war is widely understood to reflect a balance between these 
often competing considerations.224 Thus, each new law of war treaty and 
each amendment, but also each interpretive gloss, private report, manual, or 
guidance subtly alters the humanity-military necessity balance. And just as 
State understandings of law of war rules evolve, so too the desired point of 
balance between humanity and military necessity shifts over time. The results 
that States, their armed forces, international tribunals, academia, humanitar-
ian organizations, and civil society expect from the law of war change with 
the character of war, but also in response to current senses of morality and 
public conscience.225 Law of war literature—whether legal manuals, judg-
ments, publications, reports, or even protests—from any of these constitu-
encies reflects not only doctrinal assessments, but also normative assess-
ments of an appropriate balance between humanity and military necessity. 
Just how greatly military operations can or should be curtailed in the name 
of humanity, and just how much human suffering should be tolerated to 
achieve military objectives is a central—though often latent—debate within 
and between competing law of war works. 
If law of war interpretation involves both analysis to discern operative 
law, as well as to reflect the humanity-military necessity balance, the Guidance 
is a commendable effort to focus attention on a fundamental purpose of the 
law—to preserve a measure of humanity even in the desperate and danger-
ous conditions of combat. Despite presenting problematic issues of inter-
pretation, the Guidance remains a compelling argument for incorporating hu-
manitarian interests into the law of war. 
However, the Guidance seems based on a narrow or incomplete under-
standing of the purposes of the law of war. Its interpretive effort skews al-
most exclusively to humanitarian concerns at the expense of considerations 
of military experience and practice. There is no evidence of concerted effort 
to consult or incorporate military doctrine or the rich historical experience 
of siege operations or, for that matter, other military operations that involve 
isolation. Similarly, the Guidance includes no assessment of the impact its in-
terpretation would have on military operations. 
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The Guidance is, at its heart, a subtle attempt to renegotiate the bounda-
ries of the law in the name of humanitarianism. It identifies in the law a 
concealed plea to humanitarian logic previously unappreciated by States or 
by two generations of law of war scholarship. The Guidance reflects an at-
tempt to accomplish something not found in interpretation but rather in the 
slow, difficult work of diplomacy and drafting. Undoubtedly with good in-
tentions, the Guidance authors refine the law to a greater extent than States 
apparently wished. But whether specificity is actually desirable should be 
considered carefully. Ambiguity, while vexing to jurists and academics, is of-
ten an essential aspect of international regulation. In some cases, ambiguity 
reflects important limits of consensus among States. Unclear or seemingly 
incomplete rules are often compelling evidence of what separates States’ 
views on a subject. Unclear rules can also reflect States’ judgment that more 
precise or logically consistent rules would prove legally unmanageable. 
But more than an exercise in a priori humanitarian interpretation, the 
Guidance should be appreciated as an alteration in the balance between hu-
manity and military necessity. The law of war reflects balancing points estab-
lished with respect to discreet issues and battlefield circumstances. For ex-
ample, nearly absolute protection for hospitals reflects States’ judgment that 
humanity should prevail over all but the most compelling military neces-
sity.226 Likewise, the previously described limits on a State’s right to reject 
offers of humanitarian relief for children and expecting mothers found in 
Article 23 of GC IV reflects an instance of humanity prevailing over the 
military imperative of isolation. 
The law of war also involves a meta-balance—an aggregate balancing 
point at which humanity and necessity are comparatively served by the law 
of war writ large. Various periods of the law of war attest to different bal-
ancing points. The early law of war took relatively little account of humani-
tarian interests. Entire categories of victims of war were left unprotected and 
military necessity in targeting was nearly unconstrained. The twentieth cen-
tury saw States accept greater and greater limits on their conduct in armed 
conflict in the name of humanity. An empirical assessment of the relative 
weight presently accorded to humanity and military necessity is difficult to 
identify but nonetheless, one can certainly discern movement in favor of 
humanity. 
It may be too much to say that the Guidance significantly alters this meta-
balance. But extrapolation of its interpretive sleights of hand and its resort 
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to humanitarian logic to other law of war subjects and debates could quickly 
do so. The law of war balance would surely be altered if each law of war 
ambiguity were resolved exclusively by resort to humanitarian objects or pur-
poses, without equal attention to military necessity as reflected by historical 
experience and military doctrine. Those preparing the Guidance appear to 
have been unhappy with the prevailing law of war balance with respect to 
offers of humanitarian relief. It undoubtedly shifts the bargain struck by 
States with respect to humanitarian relief operations in favor of humanity. 
The effort that produced the Guidance might have more useful as a pro-
ject to consult with States to identify the potential for treaty amendments. In 
particular, a better accounting for the military equities and imperatives of 
siege might have guided the authors to a sounder interpretation from both 
doctrinal and normative perspectives. Furthermore, such an approach might 
have expressed and achieved desirable doctrinal and normative unity on a 
subject of critical importance. It is perhaps underappreciated in this period 
of prolific law of war scholarship and interpretation that each dissent, each 
new view, each fragmentation undermines the law of war as something, 
sometimes the only thing, which unifies opposing parties. Seeking consensus 
informed by humanity, as well as military necessity, rather than pushing the 
boundaries of humanitarian logic, seems a far more promising means to ad-
vance humanity. 
In sum, the authors of the Guidance employed a wide range of sophisti-
cated interpretative techniques to identify an obligation on the part of States 
not to arbitrarily withhold consent to relief actions during armed conflict. 
Casual readers may find it a compelling account of international law. Even 
experienced jurists and law of war practitioners may find its analysis persua-
sive. Yet, on careful examination, each of its three interpretive arguments 
suffers difficulty. Its textual construction of Article 70(1) unnecessarily com-
plicates a passage that is clear and settled in its meaning. It then bootstraps 
that engineered ambiguity to justify resort to a narrow segment of negotiat-
ing history that excludes extensive debates and drafts inconsistent with its 
conclusion. Finally, the Oxford Guidance offers subsequent practice drawn not 
from comprehensive surveys of State practice, but rather from similar efforts 
by like-minded non-State actors to bolster its findings. The result is an at-
tractive appeal to humanitarian logic, but a nonetheless strained interpreta-
tion of States’ obligations to accept relief actions during armed conflict. Cer-
tainly, no nefarious motive should be attributed to its authors; rather the 
Guidance seems a product of dogged attention to humanitarian interests and 
logic to the neglect of the military imperatives of its important subject. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In September 1782, unable to maintain effective isolation of Gibraltar, Span-
ish forces joined by French troops, abandoned hopes of starving out the 
British garrison. On September 8, they launched their “Grand Assault,” mus-
tering nearly 50,000 fresh soldiers to the defenders’ 5,000, who were self-
described as “feeble as old age for want of succour . . . including sick, 
wounded, and disabled.”227 Still, the garrison withstood and returned each 
bombardment, inflicting particularly costly damage to the blockading fleet’s 
seaborne artillery barges.228 By October 12, a British fleet under the com-
mand of Admiral Howe arrived, providing reinforcements and distracting 
the Spanish ships from their bombardment.229 On February 2, 1783, the new 
French commander Duke de Crillon ceased hostilities. Although the siege 
featured fierce and desperate combat, failure to prevent the delivery of relief 
supplies is credited as the leading cause of the siege’s failure.230 
The Gibraltar siege, like nearly all sieges before and since, is a heart-
wrenching tale of human torment. This tragic story of suffering and many 
others like it have inspired notable efforts by States to codify limits on the 
conduct of siege. Yet judged from a humanitarian perspective, the law of war 
applicable to sieges, and especially to offers of humanitarian relief, includes 
glaring logical flaws and gaps. The urge to correct these flaws or to fill these 
gaps, especially by resort to humanitarian logic and interpretation is compel-
ling, and in some respects, admirable. The Oxford Guidance is an understand-
able effort to close these gaps by resort to a range of legal interpretive meth-
ods, each guided by a compelling humanitarian logic. 
Still, law of war development has never been exclusively an exercise in 
humanitarian logic. Whatever success the law has had at humanizing the con-
duct of war is attributable at least in part to efforts to account for the realities 
of armed conflict and to incorporate military imperatives and equities. With 
respect to siege operations, no military consideration is clearer than the ab-
solute imperative of imposing complete physical, psychological, and elec-
tronic isolation. What may appear to some as inadequacies of the law regu-
lating relief actions, including discretion to reject offers of impartial human-
itarian relief, may actually be reflections of States’ armed forces’ considerable 
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military experience with siege. Discretion to withhold consent to offers of 
humanitarian relief actions is an entirely logical, if potentially cruel, out-
growth of the isolation imperative and operational experience. It is worth 
considering, contrary to the views expressed in the Guidance, that the pres-
ently permissive rules for withholding consent to relief actions reflect not 
inadequacies but rather the presently-operative balance between humanity 
and military necessity. 
 
